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 If a beneficiary of a spendthrift trust has a right to withdraw property from the 
trust, may the beneficiary‟s creditors reach the assets subject to the withdrawal power? 
That was the principle question recently addressed by the 1
st
 District Court of Appeals in 
Great American Insurance Company v. Thompson Trust.
1
 Also of interest: the case may 
have involved an offset by the trustee of amounts distributable to the beneficiary to repay 
amounts owed by the beneficiary to the trust. 
 
Background.  
 
When she died, Patricia Smith Thompson‟s will created a testamentary spendthrift 
trust (the “Trust”) for the benefit of her husband, Morley.2 The terms of the Trust gave 
Mr. Thompson the annual right to withdraw from principal the greater of $5,000 or 5% of 
the value of the trust assets.
3
  
 
As executor for Mrs. Thompson‟s estate, Mr. Thompson improperly disposed of 
trust assets. The resulting litigation was settled, but Mr. Thompson did not pay more than 
$1.3 million that he was obligated to pay to the Trust under the settlement agreement. His 
default led the probate court to issue an order that while his debt to the Trust was unpaid, 
no further distributions were to be made to Mr. Thompson from the Trust. Rather, any 
amounts he otherwise would have been entitled to receive from the Trust were to be 
applied against his debt to the Trust.
4
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 A year and a half later, Great American Life Insurance Company (“GALIC”) 
obtained a default judgment against Mr. Thompson for nearly $5.8 million in connection 
with obligations he had guaranteed. Shortly thereafter, GALIC filed a creditor‟s bill and 
complaint under R.C. §2333.01 against Mr. Thompson and the Trust. (Under §2333.01, 
judgment creditors may reach, among other things, any interest of the debtor in “a money 
contract, claim, or chose in action, due or to become due to him, or in a judgment or 
order, or money, goods, or effects which he has in the possession of any person or body 
politic or corporate.”) The Trust defended the action on three grounds: (1) that the 
spendthrift provision prohibited GALIC from reaching Mr. Thompson‟s interest in the 
Trust; (2) that the probate court‟s order prevented GALIC‟s lien from attaching to Mr. 
Thompson‟s interest in the Trust; and (3) that if and to the extent GALIC could secure a 
lien against Mr. Thompson‟s interest in the Trust, it was junior to the Trust‟s claim. 
 
Although Mr. Thompson did not respond and had another default judgment issued 
against him, GALIC‟s claim against the Trust was tried. The trial court rejected each of 
the Trust‟s defenses. As summarized in the appellate court‟s opinion: “The trial court 
concluded that the spendthrift provision did not prohibit Great American from asserting 
an equitable lien on the nondiscretionary trust distributions
5
 to Thompson, and that Great 
American had a priority lien on that money in preference to the … Trust, despite the 
probate court‟s order directing the trustees to retain any money due to Thompson in order 
to pay off Thompson‟s debt to the trust.”6 The court of appeals affirmed. 
 
Spendthrift Protection. 
 
 In 1991, in Scott v. Bank One Trust Co., the Ohio Supreme Court broadly upheld 
the validity of spendthrift provisions.
7
 The appellate court in Great American, however, 
distinguished Mr. Thompson‟s withdrawal power from a beneficial interest in a trust that 
is protected by a spendthrift provision. A power of withdrawal is a presently exercisable 
general power of appointment.
8
 The question was thus whether GALIC, as a creditor of 
the holder of a presently exercisable general power (over assets in a spendthrift trust of 
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which the holder is a beneficiary), could reach the assets subject to the power. In holding 
that it could, the court characterized the rule to that effect under the Restatement (Third) 
of Trusts as “black-letter trust law.”9 While the Restatement‟s rule the court relied on 
may well be the right one from a policy perspective – given that the holder of an 
unconditional presently exercisable power has unrestricted, unilateral access to the 
property subject to the power for the holder‟s own benefit – it is an overstatement to 
describe it as black letter law. 
 
 According to the Restatement (Second) of Property, the rule – that creditors of a 
holder of an unexercised, presently exercisable general power of appointment may reach 
the property subject to the power – is inconsistent with the law of most states, and is not 
the law except to the extent a statute so provides.
10
 Statutes in a number of states do so 
provide,
11
 although in most, creditors may reach the appointive assets only if other 
property available for payment of their claims is insufficient.
12
 Similarly, the rule under 
federal bankruptcy law is that the power holder‟s creditors may reach property subject to 
a presently exercisable general power of appointment,
13
 and federal tax law also treats the 
holder of such a power as the owner of the property subject to the power.
14
 Case law in 
several states does not allow creditors of an unexercised, but presently exercisable 
general power to reach property subject to the power, however.
15
 Similarly, statutes in 
Alaska and Rhode Island do not allow a power holder‟s creditors to reach the property 
subject to the power unless it not only is a general power, but also is exercised in favor of 
the holder, the holder‟s estate, or the creditors of either.16  
 
Consistent with the Uniform Trust Code (UTC), the pending Ohio Trust Code 
(OTC) reaches the same result as does the Restatement (Third) of Trusts by treating a 
power of withdrawal as equivalent to the power of a settlor to revoke a revocable trust,
17
 
thus allowing creditors of the power holder to reach the assets subject to the power.
18
 
(Note, however, that under the OTC and the UTC, that result applies only “during the 
period the power may be exercised.”19 Further, if the holder allows the power to lapse, 
the holder will be treated as the settlor of the trust only to the extent the value of the 
property affected by the lapse exceeds the greater of the 5 x 5 amount or the annual 
 4 
exclusion amount, which under the OTC is doubled if the donor of the gift to the trust is 
married at the time of the transfer.
20
) The rationale for the OTC and UTC treatment is 
that a presently exercisable general power and the power of a settlor to revoke a 
revocable trust are “functionally equivalent.”21 Thus, the result in Great American – that 
GALIC could reach the property subject to Mr. Thompson‟s right of withdrawal despite 
the spendthrift provision – would also be reached under the OTC. 
 
Prior Probate Court Order. 
 
 As mentioned above, before GALIC filed its creditor‟s bill and complaint, the 
probate court issued an order directing that any amounts otherwise distributable to Mr. 
Thompson from the Trust instead be retained in the Trust to reduce his $1.3 million 
obligation to the Trust. In its appeal, the Trustee argued that the trial court erred in 
granting GALIC a secured priority interest in amounts Mr. Thompson could withdraw 
under the 5 x 5 power in preference to the Trust‟s interest in those amounts. The appellate 
court disagreed, finding that the probate court‟s order did not amount to a lien on Mr. 
Thompson‟s interest. Citing 51 American Jurisprudence 2d of Liens (2004), §11, the 
court stated that “[l]iens may only be created by agreement or by a fixed rule of law, but 
not by courts.”22 Further, while characterizing the Trust as a creditor of Mr. Thompson, 
the court noted that the Trustee “never sought to obtain a lien or to secure its interest in 
Thompson‟s right to withdraw money at the end of each year.”23 Accordingly, the Trust 
was an unsecured creditor “whose interest in Thompson‟s right to withdraw was 
subordinate to Great American‟s secured interest.”24 
 
Mr. Thompson’s Income Interest? 
 
 According to the appellate court‟s opinion, Mr. Thompson not only had a 5 x 5 
power to withdraw principal from the Trust, he also was entitled to receive its income.
25
 
The appeal, however, did not involve Mr. Thompson‟s interest in the Trust‟s income. 
Rather, the parties‟ briefs, and the appellate court‟s opinion, address only the question 
whether GALIC could reach amounts Mr. Thompson could withdraw by exercising his 5 
 5 
x 5 power. Because the probate court ruled that “no further distributions be made to 
Morley Thompson regardless of any circumstance or entitlement,” with any distributions 
he otherwise would be entitled to receive to be applied to his debt to the Trust, the 
implication is that income distributions otherwise to be made to him instead were to be 
offset against his debt to the Trust despite its spendthrift nature. Curiously, however, 
there is no mention in either party‟s brief of Mr. Thompson being entitled to receive 
distributions of Trust income. 
 
 If in fact Mr. Thompson was entitled to receive distributions of Trust income, in 
addition to having the right to withdraw principal under the 5 x 5 power, the question 
whether the Trustee could offset the Trust‟s income against Mr. Thompson‟s debt to the 
Trust, despite the spendthrift provision, would be raised. Because of the breadth of the 
Ohio Supreme Court‟s opinion in Scott upholding spendthrift provisions,26 in my view it 
is doubtful that an offset spendthrift exception would be created by an Ohio court under 
existing law.
27
 Further, the pending Ohio Trust Code lists only two spendthrift 
exceptions
28
 and expressly states that they and three others are the only exceptions to the 
effectiveness of a spendthrift provision.
29
 Because a trustee‟s claim against a spendthrift 
trust beneficiary is not among those exceptions, presumably such a claim could not be 
successfully asserted under the OTC. 
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 2006 WL 199751, 2006-Ohio-304. 
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 The facts recited in this article are taken not only from the court‟s opinion, but also from the parties‟ 
briefs. The spendthrift provision in the trust instrument explicitly prohibited the voluntary or involuntary 
alienation of Mr. Thompson‟s interest in the trust. 
3
 The court‟s opinion states that Mr. Thompson could withdraw “$5,000, plus 5% of the fair market value 
of the trust,” but the withdrawal provision, reproduced in the appellee‟s brief, provides that the 5% Mr. 
Thompson could withdraw at the end of the year was to be reduced by any amounts he had previously 
withdrawn during the year (i.e., any of the $5,000 that he had withdrawn during the year).  
4
 The appellee‟s brief states that Mr. Thompson exercised the withdrawal power for the year 2001 and 
withdrew nearly $490,000, indicating the trust had a value at that time of nearly $10,000,000, and that he 
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withdrew nearly $377,000 more for 2002. In both cases, the withdrawals were not actually made to him, 
but were applied against his debt to the Trust. 
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 It is clear from the court‟s opinion that its reference to “nondiscretionary trust distributions” refers to 
amounts Mr. Thompson could withdraw from the Trust by exercising his 5 x 5 power. 
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judgment, no more his „property‟ than the power to write a book or to sing a song.‟ In re Armstrong, 17 
Q.B.D. 521, 536 (1886).” JESSE DUKEMINIER ET. AL., WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 594 (7th ed. 2005). 
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 See supra note 1, at paragraph 14. 
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 Id. 
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 See supra note 1, at paragraph 4. 
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 See supra note 7. 
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 Arguably, a spendthrift provision should not be effective against a claim by the trustee, however, because 
the trustee is the owner of the trust property. Thus, a spendthrift provision prohibiting the voluntary or 
involuntary transfer of the beneficiary‟s interest would not apply to the trustee with an offset claim, because 
the trustee would be retaining property, rather than transferring it. However, trust beneficiaries have an 
equitable, or beneficial, interest in the assets of the trust. Allowing a trustee to offset property that 
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trust. For more on the offset exception to spendthrift protection, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) TRUSTS § 59, 
cmt. a(2) and Rptr. Notes  (2003). 
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 See Ohio Trust Code §5805.02(B). These two exceptions relate to (i) support claims of a child or current 
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